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manufactured by S. & C. and that this defect was the cause of
the injury to plaintiff.
Defendant S. & C., in support of its motion to vacate service
under rule 3211(a)(8), alleged that it was a Delaware corporation and that it did no business in New York. In considering the issue of jurisdiction under section 302(a) (2), the
court cited, with approval the Illinois Gray case.81 The court
made a factual determination that "defendant's products are used
and consumed in this state in, sufficient quantity and this defendant knew that its product was being shipped to New York
for us [sic] therein." 82 On 'this basis the court suggested that
sufficient "contact" with New York was present. No reference
was made to the Feathers decision.
Perhaps the distinguishing factor between Feathers and Fornabaio lies in the statement above quoted. However, the distinction
is of questionable validity. The Feathers case did not rely on
the quantity of the defendant's New York contacts; it held,
simply, that if the tortious act occurred outside the state, section
302(a)(2) is inapplicable. There is some merit in defendant's
contention that it committed no act in the state and that section
302 (a) (2) requires such act, but this was not held to be a bar in
the analogous Gray case under a similarly worded statute. Supporting
the Fornabaio case is Lewin v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co.,83 which distinguished Feathers as involving only an "isolated"
contact that defendant had with New York.
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The only significant case interpreting section 302(a)(3) is
Hempstead Medical Arts Co. v. Willie.34 In that case, defendant
rented office space in New York from plaintiff. During the term
of the lease he vacated the premises and defaulted in his payment
of rent. At the time of the commencement of this action for rent
due and for expenses incurred in re-letting the premises, defendant
was a domiciliary of Maine. His motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction under rule 3211(a) (8) was denied. The court held
that jurisdiction existed by virtue of section 302 (a) (3), since the
action arose out of defendant's use or possession of real property
located in the state.8 5
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There is as yet no reported case on § 302(a) (3).

